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Abstract-In this paper we examine the suitability of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) in performance 
monitoring systems at the state and local levels of government We find the AHP to be a suitable technique 
for eliciting weights for developing overall performance scores for public agencies and think it would be 
useful for tying funding levels to performance levels. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the past decade, interest in performance monitoring systems has increased at both the state 
and local levels of government. In 1976,28% of the municipalities responding to a survey conducted 
by the International City Managers Association reported using a performance monitoring system 
to track performance. By 1982, this number had increased to 68% [l]. 
Recently, some states have evidenced interest in using such performance monitoring systems to 
tie funding levels to performance 1evels.t One approach would require agencies to sign performance 
agreements that set the performance level to which they will be held. Agencies performing below 
the specified level would receive reduced funding. Another approach would tie the current year’s 
performance to a bonus appropriated for the current year and subsequently either allotted or 
withheld, contingent upon the agency’s reaching some prespecified performance level. (For an 
article recommending conditional appropriations, see Ref. [S].) 
In 1983, the Florida legislature tied merit increases for public school teachers to a multidimensional 
performance index. Each school district was required to assign half its merit allocation to teachers 
in the top-quartile schools, based on established performance criteria. The legislature stipulated 
that one of the measures used must be improvement in student scores on standardized tests but 
left the other performance measures, e.g. improved discipline or achievement in national academic 
competition, to the individual school districts. Both the local school board and the teacher’s union 
were required to approve each district’s performance criteria. 
An extensive literature on organization effectiveness (for recent reviews of this literature, see Refs 
[6-lo], as well as this recent legislation, testifies to the multidimensional nature of measuring 
performance. When organizations use multiple measures to assess performance, however, problems 
can arise in making performance comparisons. Using multiple measures complicates both 
comparisons made over time periods and comparisons made across agencies. Suppose, for example, 
that a school district administrator uses five measures to assess the performance of the individual 
schools within her/his district. Also suppose that school A’s performance compared to the goals 
set for the district is as follows for 2 years: 
School A 1984 1985 Change 
Maths test scores (%) 95 90 -5 
Reading test scores 88 86 -2 
Attendance loo 93 -7 
Drop-out rate 78 100 +22 
Teachers with master’s degrees 40 42 +2 
t Section 16.421 of the Wisconsin Statutes, passed in 1977, is an early example of legislation requiring performance 
assessments. The first year’s implementation of this requirement included plans wherein the Governor, during the executive 
budget development process, specified activities as “budget contracts”. The Legislative Fiscal Bureau, the Legislative Audit 
Bureau and the Department of Administration jointly determined the form and content of the assessment plan (see Ref. 
[Z]). For a state that has more recently turned to performance agreements, see Refs [3,4]. 
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We can see substantial improvement in reducing the drop-out rate from 1984 to 1985, some 
improvement in the educational level of teachers, but a deterioration in student test scores and 
attendance. 
How can these different rates of change be used to allocate merit dollars among the district’s 
schools? What is needed to take into account all five performance measures is some way of 
weighting the individual measures to reflect their relative importance. One could then combine the 
five weighted measurements into a single overall performance score for school A. Overall 
performance scores could then be compared over time and across schools and more easily used to 
reward schools in a way commensurate with their performance. 
The primary purpose of the research reported in this paper is to test the suitability of the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) as the method for generating these weights for performance measurements, 
This technique was selected because it seemed suitable for a mail survey, judgments could be 
elicited quickly, permitted calculating a consistency indicator for each respondent and had been 
demonstrated to provide accurate judgments when applied to situations that permit objective 
measurement of phenomena [ 111. 
A secondary objective is to learn whether the people who manage public sector programs and 
the people who hold them accountable for performance agree about which performance dimensions 
are important. Some researchers have suggested that a dimension’s importance weights may vary, 
depending upon who is asked to provide these weights [ 12-171. Others go further and assert that 
one’s view of how well an organization is performing is a function of where one stands, or the 
constituent group to which one belongs. Performance dimensions important to one constituent 
group may be unimportant to another [ 181. 
Following the recommendation that future research on this question be redirected to empirical 
investigations [19], this paper investigates the extent to which agencies and their overseers agree 
on the relative importance of different performance dimensions. If these two parties disagree, then 
how to develop a set of importance weights acceptable to both parties becomes an important 
question that must be answered before performance agreements can be successfully implemented. 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
We used the AHP in a mail survey to elicit performance dimension weights from a sample of 
public managers and oversight agencies. Described below are the respondents and the task to 
which they applied the AHP. 
Task dejinition 
To get as clear a picture as possible of how managers’ and overseers’ opinions vary, we designed 
the survey to control several factors other than the positions that respondents held that might also 
affect their responses. First, one’s judgment about the relative importance of a performance measure 
might depend upon which agency he/she had in mind when responding to the survey. To eliminate 
this variation, respondents were asked to focus upon a single agency type-probation and parole 
agencies. Second, those who judge the relative importance of different performance measures need 
to understand the workings of the agency whose performance they are judging. The sample was 
therefore restricted to probation and parole agency administrators and the states’ gubernatorial 
and legislative analysts who are responsible for reviewing and making recommendations on 
probation/parole agency budget requests. Third, one’s ratings of a performance measure might be 
sensitive to the particular way a measure was worded rather than to the performance concept that 
the measure was intended to represent. Respondents were therefore asked to judge the importance 
of performance dimensions, rather than specific performance measures. 
The sample 
Respondents were drawn from two sources. First, 100 administrators were randomly selected 
from the Directory of Probation and Parole Agencies, published by the National Council on Crime 
and Delinquency. Second, 50 oversight analysts were randomly selected from the population of 
100 state legislative and gubernatorial nalysts assigned to review the budget requests of probation 
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and parole agencies (i.e. the executive and legislative analyst for each of the 50 states). 
In a cover letter, respondents were told that the researcher was developing performance 
probation/parole programs and wanted to identify the types of measures that people thought were 
most important for judging the adequacy of agency performance. They were told that the survey 
findings would be used to set priorities on which types of performance measures to develop and 
test first. Finally, they were asked to judge the relative importance of the measures from their 
perspective as administrators or budget analysts. 
Performance dimensions used 
A review of the performance measurement literature has indicated that important performance 
dimensions for public sector agencies include the quantity and quality of output, the efficiency with 
which these outputs are produced, the equity with which these outputs are distributed, what benefits 
result and the cost-effectiveness of the resulting benefits. (For a review of the performance 
measurement literature that identifies these dimensions as important, see Ref. [20].) Respondents 
were therefore asked to judge the relative importance of these six dimensions. The survey instrument 
(see the Appendix) defined these six dimensions and gave examples of probation/parole-related 
measures that fell within them. 
SURVEY FINDINGS 
Completed responses returned from the administrators and oversight staff numbered 43 and 41, 
respectively. Table 1 shows the relative importance accorded each performance dimension by each 
group. Both groups indicate that benefit is the most important dimension. The major difference is 
the greater importance that oversight staff place upon cost-effectiveness.? Oversight staff assigned 
20% of the total weight to cost-effectiveness, while agency administrators assigned only 12% to 
that dimension. This difference seems reasonable because cost-effectiveness is the decision criterion 
that proponents of economic rationality advocate for allocating resources across agencies or 
programs (see, for example, Ref. [21]). 
The coefficient of variability shown in Table 1 indicates the degree of homogeneity in individual 
judgments within each group. The smaller the coefficient, the greater is the consensus about the 
dimension. Both administrators and oversight staff have the most consensus about the importance 
of the quality, efficiency and benefit dimensions. Quantity is the dimension for which there is the 
least consensus about its importance. 
While these two groups do not differ radically in the weights accorded these performance 
dimensions, the differences do seem large enough to affect agency performance ratings. Whether 
Table 1. Relattve importance of performance dimensions for 
probatmn/‘parole agenctes, by group 
Grouo 
PerfOr”la”Ce 
dimensmn 
Ouantitv 
Overstght staff Administrators 
% CV’ % CV” 
8 0.75 11 I .m . , 
Quality 19 0.47 22 0.41 
Equity 12 0.75 16 0.62 
Efficiency 13 0.46 I1 0.45 
Benefit 27 0.44 28 0.43 
Cost-effecuveness 20 0.50 12 0.58 
‘The coefficient of variabihty, obtained by dividing the mean 
into the standard deviation. 
t Because of the small size of the oversight staff sample, we sent out one follow-up letter to people who had not responded 
within 1 month to our original request. We did not follow up nonrespondents in the administrators group. To determine 
whether the higher response rate for oversight staff that resulted from the follow-up letter might account for the greater 
importance placed upon cost-effectiveness by the funders, we analyzed first-wave responses for oversight staff separately 
from responses to the follow-up letter. Responses to the first letter are similar to that reported in this paper for the total 
oversight staff group. For the quantity and efficiency dimensions, the percentage was the same. For quality, equity and 
benefit, the first wave was 1% lower than the total funders group. For cost-effectiveness, it was 3% higher. We conclude 
that the higher response rate does not explain the greater importance that funders place upon the cost-effectiveness 
dimension. 
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they are large enough in any particular instance will depend upon three factors: 
(a) how much variation in performance actually occurs among the agencies being 
compared with each other; 
(b) how many agencies are compared; 
(c) whether actual overall performance scores or rankings are used. 
Overall scores are a more sensitive discriminator than is rank order. If actual overall scores were 
the basis for reimbursing an agency under a performance agreement, then whose weights were used 
could have a substantial effect on the funding the agency would receive. 
Some people may wonder whether the benefit dimension received the highest rating because it 
sounds good in the abstract. We tried to avoid such a response bias by grounding the performance 
dimensions in specific measures and including these measures on the form each respondent filled 
in. We also looked to see how benefit measures fared relative to other measures reported in another 
national survey [22]. In this other survey, a majority in each of two similar constituent groups 
rated 3 of 65 measures as relevant and important for probation and parole agencies. All three were 
benefit measures. The benefit measures were not labeled “benefit” but were grouped under the label 
“outcomes of agency activities”. 
As an additional check on the validity of benefit’s being judged as the most important performance 
dimension, we reviewed the legislative appropriations hearings for two states. These hearings were 
for the 1979 and 1981 Florida Senate and House subcommittees that dealt with corrections, and 
the 1981 North Carolina House and Senate appropriations subcommittees that dealt with 
corrections. The approach was to transcribe each question that a legislator asked during these 
hearings and code each question as either relating or not relating to performance. Of the 127 
questions about performance that the legislators asked corrections agency staff, 38% were questions 
about benefit. No other performance dimension contained as large a proportion of the performance 
questions. 
We conclude that the AHP elicits valid performance dimension weights from public administrators. 
Also, we found that it is not overly demanding in terms of the abstractions with which administrators 
must deal to make the comparative judgments, it is not time-consuming and is suitable for both 
individual and group application. 
The most obvious use for this information about performance weights that involves state 
legislative and executive budget analysts and probation/parole administrators is deciding how 
much money to appropriate to the state’s probation/parole agency. Another possible use for such 
performance measurements is for state-level administrators to compare the performance of 
geographic regions or for regional administrators to compare the performance of individual offices 
within a region. One purpose for such comparisons might be allocating appropriated funds across 
regions or offices. Another might be to flag offices that are outperforming others. These offices 
could then be studied to identify what makes them more successful. Alternatively, the worst 
performing offices could be identified, as the first step in diagnosing their operating problems, and 
helping them to deal with them. These intrastate comparisons could be made in terms of either 
actual performance scores or in terms of rankings based upon these scores. 
CONCLUSION 
Using the AHP we elicited preferences from a sample of oversight staff and agency administrators 
about the relative importance of six dimensions related to the performance of public sector 
programs. The performance dimension weights elicited in this study relate to a single type agency. 
Additional research on other agency types is required before generalizing these weights to other 
public sector programs. 
These findings do suggest, however, that state and local governments that intend to tie funding 
levels to performance levels need to deal with several issues before sitting down to write performance 
agreements. First, who shall participate in deciding which measures shall be used to monitor agency 
performance? Second, who shall decide the relative importance of the measures included? 
Possible answers to both questions include employees who provide the hands on service, agency 
administrators, legislative and executive oversight staff, the chief executive and legislative body 
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itself, and all possible combinations of the above. Third, what processes hall the participants use 
to decide? Possibilities include bargaining, as between a union and management; developing a 
consensus; majority voting; and averaging preferences. 
We judge the AHP to be a suitable technique for eliciting the weights for developing overall 
performance scores, regardless of the process and combination of participants chosen. Resolving 
different opinions about performance criteria is more likely to be a stumbling block to tying funding 
levels to performance levels than are technical procedures for producing performance measurements. 
In identifying these different opinions and providing a systematic method for taking them into 
account, the AHP may hasten the day when agency performance is directly tied to funding level. 
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APPENDIX 
Which Performance Dimensions are Most Important? 
Agency performance is a multidimensional concept. The term “performance” can include such dimensions as quantity 
and quality of output, equity, efficiency, benefit and cost-effectiveness. Opinions differ about the relative importance of 
these dimensions as indicators of agency performance. Definitions of each dimension and related performance measures 
are listed below. 
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. ’ 
Quantity o/‘ output refers to the amount of an agency’s direct products, i.e. the services rendered or regulatio;s enforced. 
Examples: No. of contacts made with offenders. 
No. of investigations completed. 
No. of offenders referred to community resources. 
Quality of output refers to how well the agency is operating and encompasses a number of attributes, including conformity 
to “good” practices, accuracy and timeliness of the work completed, the public’s or the client’s satisfaction with the service 
received. 
Examples: % Of offenders who receive the level of supervision to which they were assigned. 
% Of victims served by restitution program who are satisfied with the timeliness and adequacy of payment. 
Average elapsed time between need identification and referral of offender to a community resource. 
Equity refers to how fairly services or the enforcement of regulations are distributed among people. Common ways of 
breaking down services in order to compare their distribution among different groups of offenders include age, race, sex, 
extent of need, severity of offense or length of term. 
Examples: % Of offenders needing help who are referred to community resources, broken down by race, age group and 
sex of offender. 
% Of offender problems identified for which help is obtained, broken down by whether obtaining help is a 
special condition of probation or parole. 
Average elapsed time between need identification and referral to a community resource, broken down by length 
of offender’s term. 
Efficiency refers to the cost per unit of output. 
Examples: Average cost per investigation completed. 
Average cost per office contact. 
Average cost per referral. 
Beneft refers to the effect of what the agency does upon the offender or others in society. 
Examples: No. and % of offenders who complete their term without violating a condition of probation or parole. 
No. and % of offenders with drug or alcohol problems successfully rehabilitated. 
No. and % of victims granted restitution who receive the full amount due them. 
Cost-effectiueness refers to cost per unit of benefit. 
Examples: Average cost of securing employment for an offender. 
Average cost per alcoholic rehabilitated. 
Average cost for supervision of each offender who successfully completes a term without violation. 
Instructions 
Assume that your task is to determine the performance of a probation and/or parole agency. Use the matrix below to 
compare the importance of six performance dimensions as indicators of agency performance. Definitions of these dimensions 
appear above. 
Each row in this matrix compares two performance dimensions. For each row, check the column that most closely 
reflects your opinion of the importance of the performance dimension in the left-hand column compared with the 
performance dimension in the right-hand column. For example, in the first row, a check in column +5 means that you 
believe quantity of output is strongly more important than quality of output. A check in column -3 means that quantity 
is moderately less important than quality. A check in column 1 means that the two performance dimensions are of equal 
importance as indicators of agency performance. 
+9 +I +.5 +3 1 -3 -5 -7 -9 
Quantity - - - - - - - - - 
Quantity _ - - - - - - - - 
Quantity - - - - - - - - - 
Quantity _ - - - - - - - - 
Quantity _ _ - - - - - - - 
Quality _ _ - - - - - - - 
Quality - - - - - - - - - 
Quality _ _ _ - - - - - - 
Quality 
Equity _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Equity _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Equity - - - - - - - 
Efficiency 1 z _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Efficiency 
Benefit _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Quality 
Equity 
Efficiency 
Benefit 
Cost-effectiveness 
Equity 
Efficiency 
Benefit 
Cost-effectiveness 
Efficiency 
Benefit 
Cost-effectiveness 
Benefit 
Cost-effectiveness 
Cost-effectiveness 
Please check the category that most closely describes the position you hold: 
-criminal justice practitioner; -researcher; _fiscal or budget analyst. 
